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2004 (Archived) - An important motive behind
the Bush administration's intervention in
Iraq was the goal of fostering democracy in
the Middle East. This motive, recognized as
critical to United States interests
following the September 11 attacks, is based
on the belief that autocratic,
non-democratic states have a higher
potential to create disaffected individuals
who join political groups that seek to use
violence to exercise their political
grievances. This pattern is especially
prevalent in the Middle East, where
autocracy is the norm and where most of the
militants attacking US interests are
located.
Therefore, following the September 11
attacks, the Bush administration argued that
the successful formation of democracy in
Iraq would serve as an example to other
Middle Eastern states. For one, it would
provide a warning that the creation of a
functioning market democracy in the region
is possible, even through the use of force
by an outside power. Additionally, by
transforming Iraq from a country ruled by a
dictator to one ruled by a democratically
elected government, Washington hoped that
citizens of autocratic states in the region
would no longer stand by obediently while
they were forced to obey an unpopular and
autocratic regime.
While this was an important motive behind
the intervention in Iraq, it has now lost
the support of Washington policymakers, in
addition to many insiders within the Bush
administration. The reason behind this loss
of support has been the continuous failure
to transform Iraq into a market democracy.
While it is still possible to arrest Iraq's
present downward trend, until that moment
occurs there will be little support for
further test cases of democratic
transformation in the Middle East.
Democratic transformation With the 2000
election win of President George W Bush, the
administration appointed a select few
individuals among the neo-conservative class
of the American political spectrum. These
officials - with the most prominent
neo-conservative represented by Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - were
branded with a certain sense of idealism,
believing that a democratic transformation
of the Middle East was very possible through
outside intervention, explaining why this
political class has been labeled
"democratic imperialists".
For example, before the invasion of Iraq
began, influential members of the American
Enterprise Institute - one of the leading
institutions of neo-conservative thought -
released repeated statements arguing the
positive effects that an invasion of Iraq
would bring. Joshua Muravchik, a resident
scholar at the Institute, stated in August
2002, "Change toward democratic regimes
in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a
tsunami across the Islamic world."
In September 2002, Michael Ledeen, a
freedom scholar with the institute, called
for the US to begin "a vast democratic
revolution to liberate all the peoples of
the Middle East". Ledeen succinctly
argued the critical point of this theory,
announcing that "it is impossible to
imagine that the Iranian people would
tolerate tyranny in their own country once
freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow
in short order." Bush himself stated in
his 2004 state of the union address that
"... we will finish the historic work
of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, so
those nations can light the way for others,
and help transform a troubled part of the
world."
Theoretically, a democratic
transformation of the Middle East could
occur following the successful implantation
of a market democracy there. However, the
reason that this theory is hinged too much
on idealism is that it exaggerates the
ability of an outside power to create such a
structure. Furthermore, the difference in
culture and values between the implanting
power - the US - and the recipient states -
predominately of Islamic culture - also
works negatively against the success of such
a theory.
Iraq: The first test case These doubts
were manifested in the US intervention of
Iraq. While it only took weeks to eliminate
the Ba'athist regime, many months have
passed and there is still little stability
throughout the country. Indeed, there is no
evidence to definitively state whether
progress is being made or lost. According to
US senator Lincoln Chafee, who just returned
from Iraq, and a member of the Bush
administration's Republican Party, the
situation has become worse in the last year.
Speaking to CNN, Chafee said, "It's a
very tenuous security situation. I'd been
there a year ago - what a change ... in the
Green Zone a year ago we felt very secure.
Not so this time."
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has
also questioned the viability of the Iraq
intervention. The New York Times reported on
December 7 that it had received a classified
cable from the CIA's station chief in
Baghdad warning that the security situation
in Iraq will soon deteriorate further unless
some major successes are scored.
Until it can be determined whether
progress is being made or lost in Iraq, the
intervention will do nothing to encourage
other Middle Eastern political leaders and
citizens to push for a democratic
transformation in their countries; indeed,
as of now, it has done the very opposite and
has demonstrated the potential anarchy that
can erupt following the weakening of a
central government or the creation of a
temporary power vacuum.
Furthermore, the intervention of Iraq
demonstrated the political, military and
economic toll that can affect the US
negatively if an intervention goes awry.
For instance, while the Bush
administration won the 2004 presidential
election, it has lost a lot of support from
the American people, and the population
itself is split almost evenly into two
political camps. Much of this national
divergence can be blamed on the impact of
the Iraq intervention to both the US
military and economy.
The US has lost over 1,000 soldiers in
Iraq, and it has been forced to keep over
100,000 troops in the country, with the
total troop commitment presently hovering
around 150,000. This sort of troop
obligation has stretched the US military to
the point where its present global
commitment is simply unsustainable. The
ramifications of the extended troop
commitment to Iraq are already evident, seen
through the May 2004 decision to withdraw an
army brigade from the US Army's 2nd Infantry
Division in South Korea to Iraq.
Finally, the funds required to sustain
present operations in Iraq are exorbitant,
helping to swell the US budget deficit to
US$413 billion. Over the long term,
continued high spending in Iraq could bring
economic problems, such as an extended trade
deficit and high inflation.
All of these factors explain how the
intervention of Iraq has given the US little
ability to engage in future interventions,
whether for another test of democratic
transformation or even for legitimate
national security concerns. The troop
commitment and financial costs being usurped
by the Iraq intervention have weakened the
ability of the US to project its power in
the world.
If the Bush administration were to have
seriously considered all the likely
scenarios involved in the intervention in
Iraq - including worst case scenarios - it
is doubtful that it would have carried
through with the invasion. The success of
the neo-conservative vision of democratic
transformation hinged on the realization of
a best-case scenario, which was a reality
that failed to occur. As clearly argued by
Wolfowitz before the invasion, "I am
reasonably certain that they will greet us
as liberators, and that will help us to keep
[troop] requirements down."
Instead, the US hasn't yet had the luxury
to work on a true democratic transformation
in Iraq because it is still trying to foster
some sort of stability in the country. As
stated by retired army Colonel Raoul Alcala,
who served as an advisor to the Iraqi
Ministry of Defense, "Plan A - what the
US actually did - failed, and Plan B - the
adaptations since the end of 'major combat'
- hasn't worked either, so far." This
leaves the US in the awkward position of not
being able to resort to a viable military
and political strategy.
Retreat from the transformation theory
The Bush administration's retreat from its
vision of a transformation to market
democracy for Middle Eastern states is
evident in the lead-up to the December 11
summit meeting in Morocco intended to
promote democracy across the region. US
officials have made clear that they will not
demand the region's leaders to reform,
instead coming with a package of financial
and social initiatives - plans that will not
create much discomfort in the region's
autocracies. Middle East analysts Tamara
Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes of the
Brookings Institution point to the problems
of this strategy, "Economic reform is
something for which nearly all Arab
governments are willing to accept
assistance, regardless of the donor, but
whether economic change can contribute to
the degree of liberalization that the United
States sees as necessary to reduce political
extremism is uncertain."
Discussing the upcoming meeting, US
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in a
radio interview that he hoped the Middle
Eastern states attending the Morocco summit
meeting would "come to an understanding
of the need for reform and modernization in
the broader Middle East and North Africa
region". This is far from the
administration's stance in January of 2004,
when Bush announced, "As long as the
Middle East remains a place of tyranny and
despair and anger, it will continue to
produce men and movements that threaten the
safety of America and our friends. So
America is pursuing a forward strategy of
freedom in the greater Middle East. We will
challenge the enemies of reform, confront
the allies of terror, and expect a higher
standard from our friend."
Conclusion One of the prime motives for
the intervention in Iraq was to test the
neo-conservative theory of democratic
transformation in the Middle East. This
theory's chance for success was questionable
from the very beginning, since there are few
historical examples of an outside power
intervening in a country with vast cultural
differences and successfully implementing a
market democracy there. Additionally, Iraq
was a very poor choice for the execution of
this theory to begin with, considering that
the country has never settled the question
of how power will be shared between its
three main ethnic/religious groups (Shi'ite,
Sunni and Kurd); creating a power vacuum in
such a state is a sure way to pull the
intervening power into the center of civil
strife and potential civil war.
The Bush administration and the US have
discovered all of these difficulties in Iraq
and are struggling to create some sense of
stability. The overbearing cost of the Iraq
intervention - in terms of political,
military and economic costs - has demanded
the full attention of the Bush
administration, and it is unrealistic to
expect the administration to push for
further democratic transformations elsewhere
in the region.
Instead, the administration can be
expected to cut its geostrategic losses and
try to preserve the gains it has made. A
retreat from Iraq would be a devastating
development to the image of the US in the
eyes of its detractors, and would likely act
as a huge boon for al-Qaeda's recruitment
ability, similar to the effect that resulted
from the Islamist victory over the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan. It would also have the
potential of weakening US power in the
world, although this could be easily
prevented by strong shows of force by the US
in regional hotspots.
Nevertheless, because retreat carries
such negative connotations, the Bush
administration will isolate itself from
policies that have as their potential
outcome further political, military and
economic pressure brought to bear on the US.
For the time being, and until conditions
turn favorably in Iraq, the Bush
administration can be expected to shelve any
serious designs at democratic transformation
in the Middle East.
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